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ABSTRACT
Digital evidence is increasingly relied upon in computer forensic examinations and legal proceedings in the
modern courtroom. The primary storage technology used for digital information has remained constant over the
last two decades, in the form of the magnetic disc. Consequently, investigative, forensic, and judicial
procedures are well-established for magnetic disc storage devices (Carrier, 2005). However, a paradigm shift
has taken place in technology storage and complex, transistor-based devices for primary storage are now
increasingly common. Most people are aware of the transition from portable magnetic floppy discs to portable
USB transistor flash devices, yet the transition from magnetic hard drives to solid-state drives inside modern
computers has so far attracted very little attention from the research community.
Here we show that it is imprudent and potentially reckless to rely on existing evidence collection processes and
procedures, and we demonstrate that conventional assumptions about the behaviour of storage media are no
longer valid. In particular, we demonstrate that modern storage devices can operate under their own volition in
the absence of computer instructions. Such operations are highly destructive of traditionally recoverable data.
This can contaminate evidence; can obfuscate and make validation of digital evidence reports difficult; can
complicate the process of live and dead analysis recovery; and can complicate and frustrate the post recovery
forensic analysis.
Our experimental findings demonstrate that solid-state drives (SSDs) have the capacity to destroy evidence
catastrophically under their own volition, in the absence of specific instructions to do so from a computer.
Keywords: digital evidence, digital forensic analysis, self-contamination, solid-state drive, SSD, garbage
collection, write-blocker
1. INTRODUCTION
Evidence stored on electronic media normally contains useful metadata, such as key dates, times, and file
antecedents, and so is sometimes considered superior to conventional paper evidence. Its persistence in
recording important data provides potentially valuable information relating to events under investigation
(Flusche, 2001; Janes, 2000). However, digital evidence is easily
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Digital evidence requires validation to test its reliability and gauge its admissibility and weight. It is important
to identify any possible contamination or loss of data that has occurred during the recovery processes
(Boddington, Hobbs & Mann, 2008). If a forensic image of a drive was (or was perceived to have been) altered
during recovery, the burden of proving the image’s integrity rests with the party tendering the evidence.
Otherwise, the opposing party is able to question the integrity of the forensic image because of deficient
recovery and preservation processes (Berg, 2000). Berg predicted that questions about the authenticity of a
forensic image and whether it was tampered post-capture were likely to arise and would be difficult to refute
(Berg, 2000).
To minimise contamination, the recovery process should prevent overwriting of data on the exhibit drive. For
example, during dead analysis recovery all processes are terminated by de-powering the system before making
a forensic image of the drive, thereby, theoretically reducing the risk of alteration to the data (Carrier, 2005). A
cryptographic hash is calculated to allow parties to show that the data has not changed if the recovery process is
repeated. Any change between hash values would show that data has been modified and would raise alarm
about the integrity of the forensic image (Carrier, 2005). The recovery of digital data must be completed
without causing change to the data thereby minimising future challenges during legal proceedings. When
change does occur, the nature and cause for the change must be explained and described convincingly (Ghosh,
2004).
Contamination-avoidance during recovery is essential and depends on effective, error-free data recovery from
digital devices. Traditionally, write-blocking hardware combined with bit-stream image copying processes is
used (Kenneally & Brown, 2005). This is considered to allow data recovery and is believed to enhance
validation of the reliability, accuracy, and completeness of the recovered evidence (Kenneally & Brown,
2005).
In this paper, traditional assumptions about the behaviour of digital media are shown not to hold universally.
Evidence stored on modern internal primary storage devices can be subject to a process we label ‘selfcorrosion’. What is meant by this is that even in the absence of computer instructions, a modern solid-state
storage device can permanently destroy evidence to a quite remarkable degree, during a short space of time, in
a manner that a magnetic hard drive would not. Here, the phenomenon of solid-state drive (SSD) self-corrosion
is proven to exist through experimentation using real world consumer hardware in an experimentally
reproducible environment.
This paper is structured in the following way. An introduction to computer based information storage is
presented that notes historical gaps between storage abstractions and real world behaviour (Section 2). This
leads into a theoretical discussion of the behaviour of solid-state drives, and in particular, the aspects of these
increasingly popular devices that cause ‘self-corrosion’ to take place (Section 3). Four experiments are
described, and their corresponding quantitative and qualitative results are given (Section 4), and are followed
by an interpretation of the results (Section 5). Based on this, we provide recommendations and guidance for
anyone working with solid-state drives as a source of evidence (Section 6). The paper ends by discussing the
future of storage technology and offering our conclusions (Section 7, 8). Readers are then presented with two
Appendices describing the experimental environment (Appendix I) and offering source code listings for the
experimental software (Appendix II).
2. STORAGE ABSTRACTIONS AND REAL WORLD BEHAVIOUR
Every kind of information that can be stored on a computer is represented at some point as a pattern of 1s and
0s, for the purposes of computation and storage. These 1s and 0s are, however, merely a convenient
interpretation for human use – not a physical reality. In practice, what we consider to be a stored ‘1’ or ‘0’ is
actually a complex pattern of some physical phenomenon such as magnetism or electric charge that exists at a
particular place in a physical device. This idea is best demonstrated by example. In the present day, the main
memory of most computers (often referred to as RAM) represents patterns of 1s and 0s by either charging (or
not charging) a collection of tiny, battery-like capacitors. To write data, some of these memory cells are
selectively filled with electric charge; to read the data back out again, the memory controller can 'open the gate'
Copyright © 2010 ADFSL, the Association of Digital Forensics, Security and Law
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and monitor how electricity comes pouring out of each cell. This seems simple enough, yet this type of data
storage has unusual characteristics and complications that might not be guessed by a casual user. For example,
such small, fast capacitors cannot store charge permanently or even for long periods, so it is necessary to
regularly and automatically read out and recharge the memory to prevent data from silently fading away. We
call such memory 'volatile' or 'dynamic' RAM, and we do not use it for long term storage of data, because the
refreshing process requires a continual source of electrical power which can be inconvenient or impossible to
ensure. This example demonstrates that there is a gap between what we imagine data storage is doing ‘in the
abstract’ vs. the limitations, peculiarities and internal behaviours of real world storage devices.
Alternative physical technologies have been used to represent data that is being held for the long term.
Magnetic tapes and disks store 1s and 0s as magnetic domains (essentially, small magnets) on a physical
surface that either lie north-to-south or south-to-north. Again, the physical nature of a bulk storage medium
imposes limits or peculiarities upon how information may be stored and accessed within it. Magnetic tapes can
only be accessed in sequential order by playing the tape forward and backward; and magnetic disks induce
delays and errors due to the need to rotate a magnetisable surface at high speed only microscopic distances
from an electromagnetic read/write device. Optical media such as CDs, DVDs and Blu-Ray allow cheap, readonly bulk storage by relying on the physical interference of light-waves as they bounce from miniature dips and
plateaus on a reflective surface; but burning the surface can be a relatively slow and inconvenient process, and
the media is prone to deterioration over time and must be prepared appropriately before use.
As each of these new digital storage technologies has become available, a variety of tradeoffs has been made in
order to gain access to increases in speed, cost effectiveness, capacity and convenience. It is therefore in the
nature of computing that we perceive regular paradigm shifts in the ways that we store and process information.
The most overt example is found in portable storage media, which has been visibly revolutionised many times
over: punch cards replaced by portable magnetic tapes; then replaced in turn by magnetic floppy disks; optical
disks (CD-R); portable external hard disks; and most recently, fast, reliable and compact USB-based flash
memory sticks. Despite vast differences in the essence of internal operations within these physical systems,
their similarities in terms of how they are stored, placed into a computer, and accessed have allowed repeated
society-wide storage technology transitions.
In this paper, however, we are most interested in the primary storage of computers, the hard drive - a
component which most normal users do not physically handle or observe. Hard drives are of primary
importance in ascertaining the activities and information associated with a human in any matter of forensics or
law. Surprisingly, the technology behind the hard disk drives in our computers today has existed since the
1950s (Hughes, 2002), and fixed, rotating magnetic platters have been the dominant form of primary storage in
computers for a truly remarkable 50 years. Despite their pedigree, relatively few complexities have been
introduced to regular hard disk control systems; generally, controller chips only try to optimise short-term disk
accesses, cache for efficiency, and compensate for damage. The 3.5” hard disk was first produced in 1983, and
consumer hard disk drives have not changed dramatically over the last 25 years in terms of physical size,
appearance, or externally observed behaviour, despite decades of progress in technologies that improve their
speed, reliability, cost and capacity.
Their simplicity and consistency has been a tremendous benefit for those operating in the domains of policing,
forensics, and law. Well-established human processes and digital technologies exist, such as dead analysis and
write-blockers, which make it convenient and acceptable for investigators to capture physical hard disks,
extensively interrogate them for digital evidence, automatically interpret, summarise and present that evidence,
and validate the quality of gathered evidence in front of a court (Carrier, 2005). These long-established,
internationally accepted procedures even cover situations such as the automated recovery of court-submissible
evidence which a defendant has previously attempted to delete. Indeed, the peculiarity of 'deleted, but not
forgotten' data which so often comes back to haunt defendants in court is in many ways a bizarre artefact of
hard drive technology. It derives from the fact hard disks have slow access speeds relative to their capacity for
storage (which makes complete erasure very inconvenient), and from the fact that there is no performance
penalty incurred for writing over existing data (which makes complete erasure unnecessary). Put simply, the
Copyright © 2010 ADFSL, the Association of Digital Forensics, Security and Law
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last few decades have in many ways been a golden era for digital evidence. Digital evidence stored on magnetic
hard disks is awkward to expunge permanently. Hard disks generally provide the largest source of digital
evidence, and recovery of deleted data is possible through the ubiquity, simplicity and homogeneity of modern
drives. Police officers, lawyers, judges and juries stand a modest chance of being able to evaluate such evidence
robustly. Disputes, therefore, arise mostly around the periphery of the data, and are generally argued in terms of
the human interpretation of the significance and meaning of data, rather than in terms of the suitability of
physical evidence gathering methods, or data extraction processes employed (Yasinsac et al., 2003).
This situation may be in the process of changing. Solid-state drives are faster and more complex cousins of the
USB memory stick, which in the last few years have received strong interest (Chen et al., 2009). They are
typically presented with the physical appearance and connectors of a regular hard drive, and are perceived as
possessing advantages over traditional magnetic drives. Generally, they are faster, less heavy, less powerdemanding (allowing longer battery life and less use of fans), allow random access to any part of the data stored
without penalty, have lower latency, can cope with hostile environments (heat, cold, vibration, moisture,
shock), do not introduce vibration, and offer good long-term reliability, depending on how they are used (Chen
et al., 2009; Ekker et al., 2009; Drossel, 2007). Surprisingly, modern SSDs have a heritage in technologies that
are as old as magnetic disks (e.g. "core memory"), and flash-based drives have had niche uses in domains such
as military equipment for some 15 years or so (Odagiri, 2010; Drossel, 2007). It is only recently through the
popularity of USB sticks, digital music devices, and camera storage that these flash-based devices have
achieved a price point that makes their desirable capabilities affordable for the general population. As this has
happened, further research and development have been undertaken by manufacturers to ameliorate unusual
quirks perceived by consumers (described below), which have resulted in a significant increase in the
complexity of these devices, particularly, their internal controller chips.
It is the view of the authors that the increasing popularity and increasing complexity of solid-state drives is a
matter of great importance for everyone working with digital evidence. We believe (with the support of
experimental findings) that existing processes, technologies, procedures and assumptions relating to digital
evidence are rapidly reducing in appropriateness and utility as SSDs increasingly enter use in retail/consumer
computers. This could have tremendous practical importance for capture of computing equipment, forensic
practice, and court validation of digital data. Put simply: the SSD technology which is replacing magnetic hard
drives inside many computers is neither simple, well understood, nor homogenous; rather it is complex, poorly
documented, and highly heterogeneous. Worst of all, it is active - that is to say, the SSD may act under its own
initiative, and may undertake quite remarkable (and highly evidence-destructive) actions even in the absence of
write commands from a computer, potentially regardless of efforts by police and forensic analysts to prevent
invalidation of evidence. We will now look at the theory of this problem and its technological origin.
3. THE PROBLEM POSED BY SOLID-STATE DRIVES
Let us begin by briefly contrasting the behaviour of a magnetic hard disk (HDD) and a flash memory-based
solid-state drive (SSD). Magnetic HDDs operate by creating or detecting oriented magnetic fields in fixed
regions of a magnetic surface, known as blocks. Each block has a 3D position and area within the disk known
as a cylinder/head/sector address. This specifies the particular platter of the disk (modern disks have several
magnetic surfaces), a particular track of the disk (distance from the centre) and the particular sector (angular
distance around the disk, e.g. 'which slice of the pie'). When the disk is asked to write to a particular block, it
translates this mathematically into the cylinder/head/sector position and magnetises the magnetic surface of the
disk in that region appropriately. If there is already old discarded data in that location, the data is automatically
converted to the new values, in much the same way as recording some TV over a used recordable video tape
does not require any special preparation of the medium, and essentially obliterates the data that was there
before. Very rarely, a sector of the disk will stop storing data correctly. If this happens, the disk controller will
make a note of the problematic sector and will redirect any requests to a small area of alternative spare space
each time someone attempts to access the broken sector.
In contrast, SSDs operate by storing data in (typically) 512kB blocks, subdivided into (typically) 4kB pages.
These pages/blocks are comprised of large arrays of NAND transistors (Olson & Langlois, 2008). These
Copyright © 2010 ADFSL, the Association of Digital Forensics, Security and Law
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NAND transistors are essentially very similar to the NAND logic chips used to build computer processors
(CPUs). However, they have an extra gate, known as a floating gate, which is used to trap charge (essentially,
to store charge on an extremely limited scale as a capacitor might). This arrangement is very stable and can
allow microscopic quantities of charge to be stored for years without leakage and without requiring a supply of
power. The term solid-state refers to the fact that the data is stored in fixed arrangements of electronic
transistors, which are in turn part of fixed materials. These transistors can be read to in tens of microseconds
and written to in hundreds of microseconds, which compares very favourably with hard disks, whose latency
for read/writes is usually 3-10 milliseconds, i.e. 30-3000 times slower (Chen et al., 2009).
Early-generation SSDs were found to have two unusual problems. The first problem is wear. Individual blocks
within the SSD can only be written to perhaps 10000-100000 times before they are at risk of failing (Olson &
Langlois, 2008). Consequently, a wear-leveling scheme is used which avoids writing data continually to the
same place. Instead, a translation layer is used that keeps track of where the computer 'thinks' it is writing. As
the computer writes to one block repeatedly, the SSD quickly translates each write to a new and less-used
location; so that the computer is unaware it is actually storing the data in a different place each time. This
significantly reduces the physical damage incurred by the blocks when a file is updated multiple times. To use
an everyday analogy, you might imagine a hotel where the hotel manager renumbers the rooms each day to
ensure that every room gets used equally, frustrating the actions of any guests who are trying to reserve a suite
they prefer. Essentially, this process is similar to the error-mapping process used by hard drives, but it is now
taking place for potentially every block of the whole SSD, with the consequence that the user has little idea
where data is really being stored inside the drive's memory pages. The part of the controller that keeps track of
where each block is being written is known as the Flash Translation Layer (FTL). SSDs generally ship with a
percentage of ‘spare pages’ to facilitate this wear-leveling process. Figure 1 demonstrates this idea.

Figure 1: File1 is using blocks 1, 2, and 3 on the drive. (a) In the case of the hard drive, these blocks are generally used
directly. (b) In an SSD, the FTL masks the real arrangement of data and hides the behaviour of the drive.

Wear-levelling, or alternatively, the extensive use of a drive’s storage capacity, can lead to a second problem: a
significant slowdown in transfer speed. This occurs because flash technology generally requires blocks to be
erased electronically before they can be used again. This is unlike the ‘write-over-old-data’ property of
magnetic tapes and disks. The erase process is very slow compared to reading and writing, taking up to 10
milliseconds of time. Furthermore, for technological reasons, only entire blocks can be erased, not individual
pages. As SSD drives fill up, even a change to a single byte may result in an entire block needing to be
read/erased and rewritten, resulting in an overt slowdown in performance. Many manufacturers have therefore
added routines to the drive controller chip that can pre-emptively act to ameliorate the 'reset' problem. One
common strategy is known as Garbage Collection or ‘Self Healing’. The underlying philosophy is to cautiously
identify areas that are not in use, and reset them as soon as possible. Various strategies can be used to achieve
this. The key problem, however, is that the drive controller does not know which operating system it will be
used with; consequently, it cannot be sure which parts of the drive storage will contain deleted and redundant
data as opposed to meaningful data, since that is decided by the operating system's mechanisms for organising
information (e.g. FAT32, NTFS, HFS+, and ext3 filesystems). However, the drive controller could note that
any page which has already been copied elsewhere as part of a wear-levelling process is no longer needed.
Consequently, it can be reset at any suitable opportunity. This is somewhat effective on a mostly-empty drive,
Copyright © 2010 ADFSL, the Association of Digital Forensics, Security and Law
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but as the drive gets increasingly full there is a tendency for almost every block to be in use. Worse still, the
operating system does not normally tell the disk when it thinks a file has been deleted and is no longer needed.
The drive controller chip may be left with the belief that all data stored on the disk is useful, even when much
of the data is redundant because the original file metadata that linked to it has been deleted. As a result, there
may be no convenient opportunity to reset many cells and drive performance may still be poor. For this reason,
Samsung, a major provider of drive controllers, decided to develop an algorithm that would work exclusively
with the NTFS filesystem. The algorithm (whose details have not been revealed by the company) is said to be
capable of looking at the 'used/unused' aspects of an NTFS filesystem by examining the free space bitmap.
Consequently, it is able to discover areas that have been marked as unused from the operating system’s
perspective. It then pre-emptively resets those blocks, making them ready for any forthcoming write requests.
These SSDs are more akin to computers than ‘dumb storage’; they react to commands from their host
computer, but sometimes act under their own initiative.
We felt it might be possible that some of these Garbage Collection technologies could be triggered to activate
in scenarios that could occur during physical capture, forensic analysis or validation processes, in the absence
of explicit write commands from the computer (the marking of the file as deleted would be an event of the
past). If garbage collection were to take place before or during forensic extraction of the drive image, it would
result in irreversible deletion of potentially large amounts of valuable data that would ordinarily be gathered as
evidence during the forensic process - we call this 'corrosion of evidence'. But this is only the first problem. The
second problem is that any alteration to the drive during or after extraction may make validation of evidence
difficult. Imagine the situation faced by a forensic analyst who takes an image of a drive (with checksum) in
order to analyse it. After taking the image, the drive is powered up prior to validation. At this point, the disk's
controller decides to carry out a phase of garbage collection and deletes part of its own data. When the forensic
analyst's image is compared against the 'original' copy, it appears that the analyst has been working with a
tainted copy, to which someone has artificially added some ‘evidence’. Yet ironically, in this example it would
be the original disk that has become tainted by its internal control chip modifying the disk contents. Potentially,
though, without knowing when garbage collection is taking place, it is impossible to be certain that any copy
taken at any time is authentic to the condition of the computer at or around the time of physical seizure of the
apparatus.
We were unable to obtain any authoritative documentation on the behaviour of the garbage collector routines
included in modern SSD drive controller chips, so we developed experiments that allow us to prove that it is
possible for drives to modify themselves very substantially without receiving instructions to do so from a
computer. The most important question we are exploring is whether SSDs can present entirely different
evidence, compared to HDDs, when interaction with the drive has taken place in precisely the same way.
We also wanted to explore two other situations. Firstly, would an experienced human investigator be able to
rebuild evidence using existing software tools after self-corrosion has taken place? Secondly, is it possible that
a traditional forensics tool such as a physical write-blocker - which is regarded as a standard in terms of
preservation of digital evidence - could still trigger or permit automated self-corrosion of the evidence on an
SSD by the drive itself?
Recall that the SSD controller chip that runs the garbage collection routine resides inside the SSD, not within
the main part of the computer. This should imply that placing a write-blocker between the computer and the
disk could be expected to have no effect (or at least, no direct effect owing to the write-blocking aspect; it is
impossible to guess what impact unusual patterns of communication might have upon controllers and garbage
collection algorithms).
The following section details our experiments. Please keep in mind that developing controlled, reproducible
experiments for SSDs that explore their behaviour is presently difficult due to the large number of variables that
may potentially interact with the experiment, because of the lack of clear documentation. It is impossible to
know which aspects of the computer, filesystem, or drive state are considered important in the view of the
programmers writing the garbage collection routines. We have therefore attempted to describe our apparatus
and experimental method in sufficient detail to allow these experiments to be as reproducible as possible. Some
Copyright © 2010 ADFSL, the Association of Digital Forensics, Security and Law
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new programs were written to allow the experiment to operate in an appropriate timescale (e.g. one of the
authors produced a forensic sampling program, which evaluates and compares hundreds of samples taken from
across the drive in the space of seconds, rather than reading the whole drive, which would take a substantial
fraction of an hour. This allowed the behaviour of the disk controller to be observed in close to real time during
the experiments, yielding interesting results). The code listings for the software produced for this paper are
freely available in Appendix II at the end of the paper.
4. EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF SSD & HDD BEHAVIOUR
4.1 Experiment 1: Do HDDs and SSDs preserve deleted data equally?
Purpose of experiment: This experiment examined whether SSDs continue to store data after deletion,
(providing it is not overwritten) in the same manner as traditional magnetic hard drives.
Method of experiment: We filled each drive with files containing the word 'EVIDENCE', quick-formatted the
drive (which resets the filesystem but does not delete the file contents), and then measured the extent to which
the drive continued to contain data from the 'traditionally recoverable' data files.
Detail of experiment: The experiment was carried out as follows. The standard experimental machine and
configuration was used (see Appendix I). The 64GB P64 Corsair SSD and the 80GB Hitachi HDD were tested.
During each test, the drive was connected to the secondary SATA channel on the motherboard and the machine
powered on. After login the drive was 'quick formatted' with the command diskmgmt.msc, producing a new
single primary NTFS partition covering the entire drive. A 196KB template file was selected containing the
word 'EVIDENCE' repeated 25000 times. The partition was filled with copies of the template file using the Fill
program in MSDOS. The copied files were numbered 1.txt, 2.txt, 3.txt... ending when the filesystem would not
allow any further files to be written (all logical blocks were full). Upon the drive being essentially filled with
data, the fill program was stopped. The drive was then immediately quick formatted as before using
diskmgmt.msc, and then immediately shutdown to a power-off state. From the time the drive was filled with
data to the time of complete shutdown was approximately 1 minute, including the time to carry out the quick
format. The machine was then left turned off for approximately 10 seconds.
The machine was then started up, and was logged into as soon as the login screen became available. The
program Go was then started in the Cygwin environment. The Go program repeatedly ran a second program,
Comparer which sampled data for approximately 3 seconds, with 5 second gaps between each set of samples.
The overall statistics for the sample from comparer were recorded into a file automatically by the Go program.
The Go program was started as soon as possible after login (approximately 1 minute from the time of power
on) and ended 15 minutes later. Comparer sampled 10KB of data from 60 positions in the drive separated
regularly by 1000MB (and 80 positions, in the case of the 80GB drive)2. This data was tested by Comparer to
see what portion of the sampled bytes were 'zero bytes'. Experiment 1 was repeated three times in total to the
SSD and HDD to determine whether the results occurred consistently and reproducibly.
Expected result: We expected to see both the SSD and HDD start with a very high fraction of non-zero data
representing the 'pre-formatting' files. We expected the HDD to continue to hold this data without modification,
as there is no process erasing or overwriting the old data. We originally had expected to see the SSD 'forget'
data over 30-60 minutes as the Garbage Collection inside the SSD explored the disk and erased the unused
parts of the disks by itself.
Actual result: The results found are shown in Figure 2. We were astonished to see that contrary to the informal
forum comments we had noted, suggesting that the drive should be left for one hour (or in some cases,
“overnight”) to carry out a partial garbage collection process, Garbage Collection consistently began around
three minutes after power-on, and consistently wiped almost all the drive (according to the samples taken) in
around three minutes. The traditional magnetic HDD results stood out in stark contrast, with the disk data
2

The sampling configuration was tested to ensure that this method of sampling would be consistent with larger or more regularly
taken samples. The numbers chosen here allowed the drives to be analysed several times per minute, which can be seen here to
give substantial insight into the behaviour of the garbage collection system.
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remaining unchanged, and thus available for forensic recovery.

Figure 2: The X axis shows time and the Y axis shows the approximate percentage of the drive that has been zeroed out.
In all three SSD runs, around 160 seconds from the log-in time (i.e. around 200 seconds from power-on), the SSD begins
to wipe the drive. After approximately 300 seconds from log-in, the SSD consistently appears to pause briefly before
continuing. 350 seconds after log-in, the SSD’s pre-existing evidence data has been almost entirely wiped. In contrast, the
HDD controller does not purge the drive.

Following the first completed run of Experiment 1, the ‘post-wipe’ drives were taken to be further examined by
an experienced digital forensic examiner. The process and results are described in Experiment 2.
4.2 Experiment 2: A human forensic re-analysis of Experiment 1.
Purpose of experiment: To determine through conventional dead analysis using forensic imaging the extent to
which an SSD and HDD configured in the same way have purged data following a 15-minute period connected
to a SATA port without write instructions.
Method and detail of experiment: The drives were taken following the end of one run of Experiment 1 and
reattached to the forensic analysis computer via a USB write-blocker, a Tableau Forensic SATA Bridge. The
analysis computer and write-blocker were then powered-on and forensic images made of each drive using a
conventional forensic imaging program, X-Ways Forensics version 15.7 SR2 to store the image on a ‘clean’
drive in accordance with conventional forensic practice. Examination of the image was then undertaken to
inspect the data and metadata present on the drive.
Expected result: We expected to see the HDD had continued to hold the data from the previous filesystem with
minimal modification, as there was no process erasing or overwriting the old data. We expected to see the SSD
had 'forgotten' data because of the garbage collection inside the SSD exploring the disk and had erased the
unused parts of the disks by itself.
Actual result: Forensic imaging was concluded 33 minutes after imaging began. The results found are shown in
Tables 1 and 2. We observed that the garbage collection on the SSD had substantially erased data and metadata
from the previous filesystem which was intact on the HDD. This resulted in the SSD drive being almost
completely wiped of data. Evidence was found supporting the prior existence of only 1,090 files from the
original 316,666 files present before the quick format. The magnetic HDD results stood out in strong contrast,
with almost the entirety of the original file data being preserved without modification as expected, and thus
fully available for forensic recovery. Evidence supporting the prior existence of 395,672 of the 395,673 files
created during Experiment 1 was found. Evidence supporting the prior existence of a further 12 files relating to
previous use of the HDD were found in the unallocated space.
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Device
Files
64GB Corsair P64 SSD
recovered
1,064 deleted ‘evidence’ text
604
files were recovered from the
drive.
460

An additional 26 deleted
‘evidence’ text files were
carved from unallocated
space.

Total files recovered

23

3

1,090

Description of recovered files
File name and temporal metadata recovered and file
partially readable (size =195 KB) but could not be
recovered as original text documents.
File name and temporal metadata recovered but not
readable (size =195 KB) and could not be
reconstituted as original text documents.
File name and temporal metadata recovered and files
readable (size =195 KB) but could not be
reconstituted as original text documents.
File name and temporal metadata recovered but not
readable (size =195 KB) and could not be
reconstituted as original text documents
Compared to 316,666 files present prior to quick
format & experiment 1 study period.

Table 1. Recovered deleted files from the 64GB P64 Corsair SSD.
Device
Files
Description of recovered files
80 GB Hitachi Deskstar
recovered
395,762 deleted ‘evidence’ text 395,761 File name and temporal metadata recovered and files
files were recovered from the
were readable (size =195 KB) and could be
drive
reconstituted as original text documents.
1
File name and temporal metadata recovered but file
not readable (size = 0 KB) and could not be
reconstituted as an original text document.
12 deleted ‘evidence’ text files
12
File name present, no temporal metadata. Files were
were carved from unallocated
not readable and could not be reconstituted as
space.
original files. These entries were associated with the
previous user of the disk and are disqualified from
the experiment totals.
Total files recovered
395,762 Compared to 395,673 files present prior to quick
format & experiment 1 study period.

Table 2. Recovered deleted files from the 80GB Hitachi Deskstar SATA drive.

Examination of recoverable files from SSD forensic image: 1,064 ‘EVIDENCE’ files were extracted from the
image. A comparison of the data content of these files with the control sample produced the following results.
i.

Zero files were recovered fully intact.

ii.

A single file was recovered containing 101,696 correct bytes of 200,000 (approximately 50%
recovered). This was the maximum level of recovery achieved for any file.

iii.

5 further files were recovered 35% complete.

iv.

The remaining 1,058 files had at least 82% damage.

v.

416 recovered files were completely empty (100% damage).

vi.

The mean average % damage to the 1064 files was: 193,107,966 bytes out of 212,800,000 possible
bytes, yielding 90.8% typical case damage to the evidence in the 'recoverable' files.

In summary: Evidence supporting the prior existence of only 0.34% of the files in the original filesystem
survived a quick format followed by garbage collection (1,090 of 316,666). Zero complete files survived
garbage collection. The file data content that survived garbage collection in total represented only 0.03% of the
data that was originally written to the drive. It appears that the garbage collection that took place within a few
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minutes during Experiment 1 had affected every file on the disk, had deleted metadata supporting the existence
of 99.66% of files, and had prevented recovery of 99.997% of file data.
Examination of recoverable files from HDD forensic image: Essentially all of the files were suitable for
extraction. A sample of 20MB of files (100 files) was selected for evaluation to determine the extent of damage
to typical files. Of these, 100% of the files were intact with the original data. No damage to the data of any file
was discovered. This is in line with what would normally be expected from a drive upon which a quick-format
was performed.
4.3 Experiment 3: Is the experimental sampling itself affecting the result?
Purpose of experiment: To explore whether the regular data-sampling process used in Experiment 1 could have
interfered with or influenced the behaviour of the SSD drive during the experiment. Recall that SSDs are a
relatively untested medium as far as forensic analysis is concerned. Could the process of study itself be
triggering the effect?
Method & detail of experiment: Here, the Corsair P64 SSD used in Experiment 1 was filled/formatted as in
Experiment 1. However, an exploratory sample was not taken until 20 minutes after Windows had loaded.
Expected result: We expected that the sampling process would have no significant impact on the general
behaviour of the disk, other than that it might perhaps have slowed down the garbage collection slightly.
Actual result: When read at the 20-minute mark, the SSD drive was discovered to have purged almost all of its
data in the same manner as was seen in Experiment 1. This matches the expected result.
4.4 Experiment 4: Can write-blockers prevent self-corrosion?
Purpose & reasoning behind experiment: The previous experiments demonstrate that simply turning on the
computer while an SSD drive is connected to a SATA channel can result in almost complete eradication of
traditionally recoverable evidence from the drive as a consequence of a block deletion program running inside
the drive controller itself, rather than because of deletion commands emanating from the host computer.
However, we wished to explore what would happen if the drive were connected to e.g. a USB-based writeblocker. Would the existing results be reproduced exactly? On the one hand, one might expect the SSD to
behave identically, since the data-destructive behaviour is being initiated from inside the drive shortly after
power is made available. On the other hand, perhaps the garbage collector is being triggered following SATA
initiation/configuration signals that would take place when connected normally to a computer. In that situation,
garbage collection might not take place in the presence of a USB write-blocking bridge. No experiment can
conclusively rule-in a write-blocker as a solution to the observed problem, as every drive and every writeblocker could interact in a completely different way. However, this experiment is capable of ruling-out writeblockers as a potential cure-all if evidence is lost that would traditionally have been preserved on a magnetic
hard drive with a write-blocker.
Method & detail of experiment 4A: An initial experiment was designed as per Experiment 1 with the SSD drive.
However, during the ten-second power-off period, the drive is disconnected from the SATA channel of the host
computer, and connected to a write-blocker. The write-blocker is powered on. The write-blocker is then
attached to the computer. The computer is turned on and Go is then run after logging into Windows.
Expected result: We expected the self-corroding behaviour should occur as before, but were not certain. We
suspected the write-blocker’s hardware might interact with the drive such that garbage-collection did not
become initiated.
Actual result: This initial experiment structure was abandoned after the first runs indicated that garbage
collection was not taking place; Comparer had reported the drive’s contents were 99.94% non-zero data. Recall
that we are attempting to discover if there are circumstances in which write-blockers are not the panacea they
are believed to be. We speculated that perhaps the write-blocker’s hardware might be affecting communication
with this particular drive in other ways besides simply blocking write commands. A second variation of the
experiment was designed to try to explore the matter further.
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Method & detail of experiment 4B: A second experiment was designed based upon Experiment 4A. The write
blocker was again connected immediately after the quick format and power-down. The experimental protocol is
the same except that the computer is now left idle at the login screen for 20 minutes before login. Then, the user
logs in and runs Go for 15 minutes.
Expected result: We expected the self-corroding behaviour should occur as before, but were unsure if the writeblocker might interact with the drive in such a way that the garbage-collection routine did not become initiated.
Actual result: Garbage collection takes place and the drive content is modified! However, the results are
different from Experiment 1. Now, Comparer suggested on all three runs that the drive was repeatedly 18.74%
zeroed-out. This compares with 0.06% zeroed-out if measurements are taken after the ‘quick format’ is
completed or when following the 4A protocol. This is a fascinating result, and we believe it demonstrates the
first ever case of a drive having substantial amounts of evidence purged from it despite the use of a
conventional hardware write-blocker. This purging of data blocks from the drive clearly takes place without a
request from the host computer. It occurs on a short timescale and in an experimental setup that is a realistic
representation of a situation that could happen in the real world (the forensic analysis computer is turned on, but
not logged into until 20 minutes later - e.g. phone call, coffee break). To confirm the result further, we ran
Comparer again with ten times as many samples, and ten times as much data per sample, yielding 600 samples
of 100kB regularly spaced across the drive every 100MB. The result from this more detailed comparison was in
line with the faster sample: 14.8% erasure was discovered. We have so far been unable to discover why only
one sixth of the drive is being wiped. However, we are confident it will be possible to find other experimental
conditions, write-blockers, and drives that will allow greater degrees of self-corrosion of evidence.
Furthermore, although this result is the first ‘bad apple’ for write-blockers, it sours the whole bunch in terms of
the degree of confidence placed in this forensic technology.
Closing note: As we observed before, there are many types of SSD drives, many firmwares, and many
approaches to garbage collection. There are also many forensic write-blocking tools and means of connecting
these to a host computer. It is possible that certain combinations of drives, firmware, garbage collectors and
write-blockers may combine to facilitate or prevent a particular hardware configuration from wiping the disk.
This does not imply that e.g. a particular write-blocker will uniformly bring about or prevent the garbage
collection process for a particular family of disks or for SSDs generally. Unfortunately, 'anything can happen'
for a particular combination, and SSD disks, flash technologies, controllers and firmware are a fast-moving and
unpredictable target.
5. INTERPRETATION AND DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
Overall, these results seem remarkable. Experiments 1 and 2 show clearly that SSDs do not behave in the same
manner as HDDs, and are quite capable of essentially near-complete corrosion of evidence entirely under their
own volition. In contrast, that same evidence is shown here to be almost entirely recoverable (both filesystem
metadata and data) if the sample drive is a magnetic drive undergoing forensic analysis. Here, the
‘EVIDENCE’ files can be seen as a proxy for complex filesystem metadata or everyday data blocks.
In the case of the HDD we have seen that almost all files are preserved after the user runs a quick format. The
sample taken indicates data in those files could later be recovered perfectly. In contrast, with the SSD we saw
that shortly after a reboot, the entirety of the files were damaged and almost all were purged completely,
including their filesystem metadata records. After only a few minutes of sitting idle, only a single file among
316,666 was even 50% recoverable; and only 0.03% of data was recoverable. The contrast is startling.
The timeframe and consistency with which data is purged is particularly astounding; the time taken to purge the
data is only a small fraction of the time taken to write data all across the disk in the first place. The drive
initiated block erasure without any trigger from the user or from an automatic program on the host computer,
which seems to indicate some kind of timer-based system being used by the garbage collection inside the SSD.
It is particularly interesting to note that the garbage collection process was not interrupted by the sampling
process that took place. This result is tremendously important in terms of validation of evidence. If the drive is
purging data far faster than the analyst can extract it, and the process of purging can begin and continue while
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the analyst is extracting the data, how can the analyst hope to capture a complete, frozen image of the disk that
is representative of the disk state at capture time?
The consistency of the results between runs of the experiments was not unexpected. Filling a drive up in an
essentially identical way with identical files should trigger an identical or near-identical response from a drive.
We do not feel there is new information to be gained from repeating these experiments further ourselves.
Another interesting concern is the physical appearance of the drive while garbage collection is taking place.
The drive does not emit any flickering light; nor does it whirr, vibrate, or click as a traditional magnetic drive
might. It looks no different when it is powered on or when it is powered off and remains silent throughout the
process. This means there is tremendous potential for digital evidence to be corroded in a physically
undetectable manner.
The results showing that purging of evidence from a drive can take place despite the presence of a physical
hardware write-blocker are especially important because they illustrate the dangers of placing too much
confidence in forensic processes and technologies, which can become ineffective or misleading as technology
progresses.
We end this brief discussion of results by presenting a thought experiment, consisting of real world scenarios
that we feel would be hard to distinguish. They are themed around the outcomes seen in the experiments.
Scenario 1a/1b: An innocent member of the public decides to reformat their drive and reinstall Windows
because of a virus or slow performance (alternatively, a criminal has a drive containing evidence of their
activities and reformats it). They 'quick format' the drive, but then decide to make a cup of tea before
continuing. Meanwhile, the SSD's controller chip analyses the new filesystem and determines that few of the
disk blocks are in use. The SSD resets most of the data blocks to prepare them for use, purging all of the data
that was previously on the disk. When police seize the computer a few minutes later, they find it to be almost
completely empty of data. A forensic analyst later wonders: was there ever anything illegal there, and if so, did
the suspect knowingly purge that illegal data from the drive?
Scenario 2a/2b: An innocent member of the public (or a criminal) quick formats an SSD or deletes their files,
for innocent (or nefarious) reasons. Police seize the computer a few seconds later. Upon being connected to
power, the drive begins to erase itself even while the forensic investigator is trying to read data from the drive.
The forensic investigator suspects the existence of a ‘logic bomb’ intentionally put in place to prevent data from
being used as evidence.
These scenarios show that the results of this paper open up serious concerns for police operations management,
forensic analysis, and court argument as an interpretation is sought for the absence of data.
6. RECOMMENDATIONS AND GUIDANCE
We suggest that:
1. Solid-state drives of all types and data stored on such drives should be immediately and
henceforth considered to be a 'grey area' as far as forensic recovery and legal validation are
concerned until extensive studies have been made of drive and data behaviour.
2. Processes that are corrosive/erasive towards data marked for deletion may take place extremely
suddenly, extremely quickly and completely automatically without human awareness or
control.
3. Present-day evidence indicating 'no data' does not authoritatively prove that data did not exist at
the time of capture.
4. Evidence of deleted data being permanently erased or partially corrupted is not evidence of
intentional permanent erasure or corruption.
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5. Cases where disk image checksums do not match at the end of the process of forensic analysis
should be considered carefully to establish if the original or subsequent images could have been
taken during or after a garbage collection process.
6. Past metadata and data blocks may be deleted without warning and without the opportunity to
realise that they had existed at time of capture.
7. Garbage collection can occur either following file deletion or following (quick/full) formatting
of a disk. ‘Quick’ formatting is therefore no longer necessarily distinct from ‘full’ formatting.
8. Formatting of disks is a normal and reasonable activity that an innocent person might choose to
do e.g. to improve the performance of an SSD drive, to tidy up the disk etc. yet may completely
eradicate evidence from a disk. Such eradication of evidence may occur within minutes.
9. We cannot guarantee previously deleted file data to be preserved on an SSD, regardless of
whether the drive image was taken during a 'live' capture of evidence or following a 'dead'
capture of evidence.
10. Drives can clearly self-modify their data after physical evidence has been gathered, despite best
practice efforts by forensic analysts to prevent such behaviour using traditionally effective
means such as write-blockers.
11. A software or hardware-based write-blocker does not protect against the drive's internal
firmware choosing to wipe data from the drive.
12. The speed at which corrosion of digital evidence takes place should be expected to increase
even further as garbage collection algorithms become more aggressive in cleaning up, and
drives become faster, and more powerful controller chips become available.
13. We feel it would be an unwise investment of time for analysts to try to develop workaround
procedures that operate against the drive controller behaviour specifically identified in these
experiments. It will not be useful; even now, a new firmware has been released for the drive,
and newer models are on the market, whose behaviour cannot be known a priori. SSDs are an
exceptionally fast-moving target.
14. We think it would be an unwise investment of time to develop procedures for physical asset
capture whereby operators attempt to distinguish SSDs from HDDs. This process is difficult
due to the similar physical appearance of the drives and the need to gain access to the
computer's internals. Also, each SSD might require unique and perhaps complex treatment to
try to prevent the operation of garbage collection. Furthermore, it is futile - the present-day
development of hybrid disks that incorporate both HDD and SSD technologies is likely to
frustrate completely any effort to distinguish SSDs from HDDs at time of capture.
15. We think it would be unwise to assume that irreversible file erasure suggests intent to destroy
evidence in cases where a defendant has quick-formatted a drive prior to police seizure. There
are reasonable circumstances (viruses, slow performance, upgrading) that might cause normal
and innocent people to quick format their drive without realising that garbage collection would
cause the appearance of ‘secure deletion’.
16. Breaking open the drive casing to try and disable/remove the drive controller and prevent a
garbage collector from running would probably be a very significant technical challenge, given
the extent to which the drive controller is bound to the data via the flash translation layer, and
given the wide diversity of drives, controllers and memory that exist.
17. Running a live analysis might allow a running garbage collector to delete data unhindered;
running a dead analysis might cause a garbage collector to activate in the forensics lab. There is
no simple answer to this problem.
18. It will probably be impossible to legislate against garbage collection.
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19. It is possible that the issues found in this paper will later come to affect USB flash drives as
well; having invested in technology that makes NAND flash systems run much faster, it would
be very peculiar if manufacturers failed to adopt it across their product range. The increasing
availability of high-speed interfaces for portable media such as USB3 makes it likely that we
will see more of these complex, evidence-corroding drive controllers in portable USB drives in
future.
20. The natural state of digital storage is not to ‘preserve deleted data’ as magnetic drives have
done for the past few decades. Future physical storage technologies can be expected to purge
deleted files to improve read and write speeds, if technology allows such a purge to be
performed quickly.
21. It seems very unlikely that international manufacturers can be collectively persuaded to provide
a universal mechanism to disable garbage collection; if anything, garbage collection is likely to
become even more aggressive. Perhaps the genie is already out of the bottle?
7. THE FUTURE OF DIGITAL STORAGE?
Here, we document numerous concerns for the future that are still emerging.
Aggressive garbage collection: In the last few years, there has been an arms race in terms of SSD controller
technologies, which has resulted in a proliferation of controller chips and firmware programs. The established
trend is to reset pre-emptively no-longer-needed flash storage cells in an increasingly aggressive manner.
Consequently, even in the absence of a computer, it is potentially possible for a powered (but disconnected)
SSD drive to erase 'deleted files' or even erase entire quick-formatted disks. It is also possible that future
controllers will engage in 'aggressive garbage collection' activities even while new data is being written to the
drive providing it does not interrupt the overall performance of the drive. It is hard to see what actions could be
taken by a forensic investigator to ascertain if a given, unknown drive will proceed to erase data permanently
upon being supplied with power during data extraction.
Faster SSDs: In these experiments, it was shown that an SSD could wipe its own data permanently (without
explicit instructions to do so) in the space of 2-3 minutes. Yet the trend is for faster controllers and faster
memory, such as recent "DDR" toggle-mode flash (Samsung Electronics, 2010). Consequently, the window of
opportunity for drives to wipe themselves completely is getting larger, and it would not be surprising to see
drives with considerably faster or more parallelised 'reset' processes in future, given that this is perceived as one
of the few remaining problems for SSDs today.
Hybrid SSDs: Presently, magnetic hard disk manufacturers are integrating SSDs and HDDS into single drives
that use the SSD as a gigantic cache for data (Beeler, 2010). Essentially this extends the idea of the DRAM
cache that is already built into SSDs. However, such integration might mean that some of the issues observed in
this paper could begin to affect traditional hard drives, for at least a sizeable fraction of the data being stored.
Host-side garbage collection: TRIM is a new standard for computer-to-disk (ATA) communication, which
allows operating systems such as Microsoft Windows 7 to inform a drive that an area of data is no longer being
used and can/should be erased (Stevens, 2010). As TRIM enters widespread use through the uptake of
Windows 7 and other modern TRIM-supporting operating systems, recovery of deleted files and old metadata
will become extremely difficult, if not impossible. The difference between TRIM and the results found here is
that TRIM commands are issued by the operating system at the time a file is deleted; it is not a pattern of
behaviour that is initiated from within the drive itself in the absence of instructions from the host computer.
Furthermore, TRIM is an action that is typically undertaken immediately, upon the data associated with a single
file, at the time of intentional direct individual file deletion. In this paper we have looked at actions that take
place on the scale of the entire drive, and that take place subsequent to user actions and in the absence of direct
deletion of individual files.
8. CONCLUSIONS
The results found in this paper may have significant implications for legal matters involving digital evidence,
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most especially in those cases where digital data is alleged to have been deleted intentionally or deliberately
permanently wiped by a defendant. Given the pace of development in SSD memory and controller technology,
and the increasingly proliferation of manufacturers, drives, and firmware versions, it will probably never be
possible to remove or narrow this new grey area within the forensic and legal domain. It seems possible that the
golden age for forensic recovery and analysis of deleted data and deleted metadata may now be ending.
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APPENDIX I: EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT
Physical computer:
Dell Precision Workstation R3400. Bios A01. 3GB RAM, Intel Q6600/2.4Hz, 232GB SATA C: HDD used as
system drive. Network adapter present but not connected during experiments.
Software:
Windows XP V5.1 (Build 2600.xpsp_sp3_gdr.100216-1513 : Service Pack 3).
No antivirus or remote desktop management programs (or similar). System restore disabled on all drives.
Indexing service disabled in ‘Services’.
Cygwin version CYGWIN_NT-5.1 1.7.6(0.230/5/3) with bash, awk, nano, cmp, bc as of 2010/08/16 16:00.
DOS command prompt with edit.exe.
Sample HDD: Hitachi Deskstar HDS728080PLA380 SATA. 80GB. Rev A00.
Sample SSD: Corsair P64 CMFSSD-64GBG2D. 64GB. Rev. VBM19C1Q.
SATA drives were connected on secondary SATA channel as D: drive during experiments. The disks were not
used as system drives. Drives were configured as single NTFS partition “basic drives” with default parameters.
Write-blocker: Tableau Forensic SATA/IDE Bridge Model T35e with USB. The device was validated as
follows. The authors attempted to write to drives or format them, and were unable to. The authors calculated
hashes on a regular hard drive with and without the device and obtained the same result.
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APPENDIX II: SOFTWARE CODE LISTINGS
These programs were written by Graeme B. Bell and are provided to support your own experimentation. You
may freely use them and modify them, at your own risk, providing you acknowledge the author and this article
in your writing.
template.sh : Cygwin script. Type ‘./template.sh’ to run.
Creates a template file consisting of the word EVIDENCE written 25000 times.
#!/bin/bash
rm ~/template
for i in {1..25000} ; do echo -ne "EVIDENCE" >> ~/template; done
fill.bat : BAT file for the DOS command environment. Type ‘fill’ to run.
Fills the D: drive with copies of the template file named in ascending order.
@echo off
echo Starting
@SET count=1
:while
@IF %count% GTR 1000000 (GOTO wend)
copy template D:\%count%.txt > NUL
@set /a count=count+1
@GOTO while
:wend
echo Finished making files
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go.sh : Cygwin script. Type “./go.sh” to run.
Runs the comparer script with 5 second delays, comparing disk vs. zeroes.
#!/bin/bash
while true; do ./comparer.sh /dev/sdb /dev/zero >> experiment-out
sleep 5
done
comparer.sh : Cygwin script. Needs cmp/awk/bc. “./comparer A B” to run.
Compares samples from 2 files (or streams) at fixed intervals over a given size.
#!/bin/bash
samplesize=10000;

# bytes to sample

size=80; # size of disk, gigabytes. PLEASE REMEMBER TO SET THIS.
gap=1000; # gap between samples in megabytes.
echo; echo -n "Comparing $1 and $2 at: " ; date
echo -n > sample
for (( P=0; P<size*1000; P=P+gap )); do # "P" will be position.
cmp -bl $1 $2 -n $samplesize -i"$P"MB | wc -l >> sample
totalsamples=$((totalsamples+samplesize))
samplecount=$((samplecount+1))
done
difftotal=`cat sample | awk 'BEGIN{t=0}{t += $1}END{print t}'`
echo "Different bytes: $difftotal of $totalsamples"
percent=`echo "scale=2; 100-(($difftotal*100)/$totalsamples)" |bc`
echo "Volumes are $percent% identical "
echo -n "Comparison ended at: "; date
echo "Sampled: $samplecount samples of size $samplesize over $size GB"
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